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Case Notes

Civil Rights-Public Accommodations-Bars and Saloons under Title IICuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965).
THEO

iOVE CUEVAS, A NEGRO, entered the Seventy Three Inn, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and demanded service. The proprietor, Thomas Sdrales, refused. When Cuevas took
exception to the rebuke, he was arrested by a Salt Lake City policeman and subsequently jailed. Cuevas brought an action against Sdrales in an effort to avail himself
of the injunctive relief provided by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 He al-

leged that Sdrales' refusal was based solely on the fact that he was a Negro and that
the food which the defendant-owner sold for consumption on the premises had passed
through interstate commerce. In addition to the injunctive relief Cuevas claimed
money damages for his arrest. 2 The District Court held that the Seventy Three Inn
1 THE CIVIL RICHTs ACT OF 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-b. (1964)
(hereinafter cited as the "Act" or the "Civil Rights Act of 1964"). Section 2000a. of the
Code was originally Title II-Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public
Accommodation in the Act as passed, and will be referred to as "Title II" due to the
common knowledge of this name. Section 201 of this title reads:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel or other establishment ... ;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises ...
(3) any motion picture house, theater ....
sports arena . .. ;
(4) any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection... ;
(d) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this
subchapter if . . . it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers of a substantial
portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells,
has moved in commerce ....
(e) The provisions ... shall not apply to a private club.
Section 204 (a) reads: ... a civil action for preventive relief ...by the person aggrieved ....
2344
F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965), n. 1 (no issue regarding second count on appeal).
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was not within the purview of Title II after finding that "beer" was not "food" within the meaning of the act, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal the United States
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed the lower court's findings in an opinion
written by Judge Pickett. 3 The court limited the interpretation of "food" on the basis
of congressional committee reports, thereby refuting Cuevas' contention that under
§201 (b) (2) the Seventy Three was an "other facility principally engaged in selling
food."
The constitutionality of the act had been initially challenged before the Supreme
Court on October 5, 1964. 4 The attorney for the Heart of Atlanta Motel based his
presentation on "five theories of law ... No. 1, that the law of the land ... is the decision of the Civil Rights Cases by this court in 1883. . .. The second proposition is
that neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Constitution prohibits racial discrimThe third proposition; ... the Civil Rights Act is an unlawful extension of
the power of the Congress under the commerce clause. No. 4, ... that the Act ... vioination ....

5
lates the fifth amendment ... and last that it violates the thirteenth amendment."
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Clark, the Court dismissed the arguments
premised on the protection of property rights under the fifth amendment and the
forced condition of servitude on the motel proprietor under the thirteenth amendment. "The power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate local incidents thereof including local activities in both state of origin
and state of destination which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that
commerce .... 6
In the companion case 7 the court upheld the U. S. Attorney General on a more
confined issue; namely the application of the act to Ollie's Barbecue whose activities
were conceded to be local in nature. The petitioner admitted the constitutionality of
the act, but questioned the applicability of §201 (b) (2). In a meticulous examination
of the commerce clause, the Court confirmed its application to food products which
had moved in interstate commerce, irrespective of the status of Ollie's customers. 8
The Civil Rights Cases of 1883,9 reviewed by counsel for appellant in Heart of Atlanta Motel, involved the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of
1875.10 While neither this nor previous statutes" dealt with bars and saloons, Mr.

8 In a similar case, Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1965), the action was for
damages and injunctive relief against police officers and the proprietor of the Celebrity
Lounge for refusal to serve a Negro. The Lounge served no food and served only white

patrons, The court stated, at page 941, "it is clear ... that the Celebrity Lounge is not a
place of public accommodation as defined . . ." within § 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Since the police were acting under color of law in an establishment not covered by the Act,
the "Color of Law" section was not applicable. (This case was not cited in the Sdrales
opinion.)

IHeart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
5
Excerpts From The Rights Cases Arguments, N.Y. Times, October 10, 1964, p. 24, col. 2.
6 Supra note 4.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 579 U.S. 294 (1964).
8
Ibid.
' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

' 0 Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, § 1.
11The Civil Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9, 1886, 14 Stat. 27 (1886); The Slave
Kidnapping Act, 14 Stat. 50 (1886); The Peonage Abolition Act, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); The Act
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Justice Bradley declared the public accommodations section of the act unconstitutional. He felt that violations by and punishment for "the individual invasion of individual rights" 1 2 were solely governed by the constitutional legislative powers of the
states.
Of the thirty odd states subsequently enacting public accommodation statutes,' 3
few have developed case law concerning the inclusion of bars and saloons under their
respective acts. On the negative side are the cases from Minnesota and Ohio 14 wherein the accommodations statutes were limited to the lists enumerated in the codes.
New York vacillated, first construing the New York Public Accommodations Statute15
to include bars and saloons, but later reversing the decision. 16 It was later admitted
that a beach club 17 not specifically covered by the statute, could exclude those whom
it pleased, but as the club was of a public nature, such exclusion could not be based
on race, creed or national origin.' 8
Massachusetts held that a tavern was a place of public accommodation within the
meaning of its statute, 19 although the listing in the statute allowed a broad base from
which to operate. In California a saloon owner who refused to serve a customer due
to his oriental ancestry was found guilty of violating a California statute with the
wording "inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses .. "20 almost identical in nature to
the 1964 federal act.
These California and Massachusetts decisions typify the trend towards a relaxation
21
of the traditional restraints on construction. In enacting its 1965 Civil Rights Act,
22
the situs of the Sdrales case (Utah), along with three other states, reflects the current trend towards coverage of bars, saloons, and beverages.
In the Sdrales opinion Judge Pickett turned to the proceedings before Congress
to support his thesis that the act was not meant to include bars and saloons. In particular, he relied upon the comments by Senators Magnuson and Kennedy which
will be examined below.
of May 31, 1870 (Voting Rights), 16 Stat. 140 (1870); The Anti-Kidnapping Act of April
20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
109 U.S. at 31 (1883).
379 U.S. 241 (1964), n. 8 lists thirty-one states with public accommodations statutes. Foi
recent legislation see UTAH CODE ANN. tit, 13, ch. 1, § 8 (Supp. 1965), AMz. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. II, ch. 9, § 41-1441 (Supp. 1965), NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 20, § 20-101 (Supp. 1963). Missouri
recently enacted a similar statute. See note 22, infra.
"Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898), citing GEN. LAWS OF MINN. (1885),
c. 244 (GEN. STAT. 8002-03) (1885); Keller v. Koerber, 610 Ohio St. 388, 55 N.E. 1002 (1889),
citing BATES ANN. STAT. § 4426-1 (Ohio).
" N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAw §§ 410-45, as construed in Babb v. Elsinger, 147 N.Y.S. 98 (1914).
" Gibbs v. Arras Bros. Inc., 222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857 (1918).
"7Castle Hill Beach Club Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y. 2d 596, 162 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1957).

IsIbid.
Is MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 92a. (1958), as construed in Bryant v. Rich's Grill, 216
Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925 (1914).
'o CAL. CODE ANN. S 51 as construed in Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P. 2d
942 (1941).
" UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 13, ch. 1 § 8 (Supp. 1965).
AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. II, ch. 9, § 41-1441 (Supp. 1965), NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 20, § 20101 (Supp. 1963). For reference to these and a recent Missouri statute see Laws Against
Discrimination,Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1965, p. 21, col. 1.
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In the preparation of the federal civil rights statute, barber shops, beauty saloons,
private clubs and retail establishments were excluded from coverage.23 No "Definitions of Terms" section appears in Title II as does appear in Title IV and Title VII
(Education and Employment). However, the generic term "food" does include all
food, drink, condiment, and nourishment consumed by man, therefore including
beer and liquors,24 while the word "restaurant" has been held to both include and
exclude bars and saloons. 25 Of primary importance, bars and saloons were not excluded by the act. 26 These combined factors seem more than coincidental.
The wording of the civil rights bill before the Senate was sufficiently broad to encompass bars and saloons. As stated in the report of the Senate, "the purpose of S1732 is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of
racial and religious discrimination or segregation by ... motels, hotels, restaurants,
places of amusement, and retail service establishments substantially affecting interstate commerce ... "27 An amendment introduced by Senator Keating would have
provided that the enumeration of any public establishment in the bill shall not be
construed to exclude its application to other similar establishments not listed. This
was disapproved. 28 One reason for this was a letter received from the General Services
Administrator to the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce which stated, "[the
amendment] is unnecessary in view of the fact that S-1732 in enumerating the places
of public accommodation ... uses the phrase 'or other public place' in each of these
29
categories."
Senator Magnuson, when presenting the bill to the Senate, remarked, "a bar, in
the strict sense of the word, would not be governed by Title II, since it is not 'principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises'."3 0 This appears to
be the only clear statement eliminating bars and saloons from Title II coverage. Its
effect must be weighed in light of the fact that the committee chose to make no such
admission in the official report. It was in response to a question by Senator Long
H. R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong 2d Sess., 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 2391.
"' The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C.
§ 321 (f) (1938) contains Congress' only official attempt to define the word "food": "The
term means (1) articles used as food or drink for man or other animals, .... "; in 1916, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Coca- Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265 (1916) made a determination concerning food under the original Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 768,
ch. 3915, § 6, which defined food as "all articles used for food, drink, confectionery or condiment by man or other animals, whether simple, mixed or compound ....
",and later treated
a cider-vinegar product as food in United States v. Ninety Five Barrels, 265 U.S. 438 (1924).
Since that time the inclusion of drink in the term food has not been questioned before the
Court. Webb v. Knight, (1877) 2 Q.B. 530, and United States v. Sweet Valley Wine Co.,
208 Fed. 85 (N.D. Ohio 1913), held that gin and wine were food. Contra Com. v. Kobert,
212 Pa. 289, 61 Atl. 895 (1905); Bolivar v. Monnat, 232 App. Div. 33, 248 N.Y.S. 722 (1931)
held that whiskey was not food during prohibition; 22 AM. JUR. Food § 2 (1939) "The
word 'food' is a very general term and applies to all that is eaten for the nourishment of
the body."; 36 C.J.S. Food § 1 (1965) "Food is that which is eaten of or drunk for nourishment.".
2 See e.g. authorities cited in notes 14-20, supra.
"Supra. note 1.
2 S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess., Appendix
"Ibid.
9Ibid.

40 Supra

note 28.
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that Senator Magnuson made this point. Senator Long's confusion is evidence of the
fact that the wording of the title actually is broad enough to include "bars", "saloons", "beer" and "liquors", and no exceptions are made in this regard. Judge
Pickett laid the foundation of his argument on the verbal report of Senator Magnuson. Thus he indicated the path that courts confronted with similar cases in the future
will doubtless follow.
House Report No. 914 (the basic structure of which was followed in the final text
of the act) concerns the bill originally passed in the House. This report names the
establishments covered as "restaurants, lunch counters, and similar establishments,
including those located in retail stores or gasoline stations ....- 1
Both committees probed exhaustively into the subject of "voluntariness". Judge
Pickett stressed fragments of these proceedings in his opinion in the instant case.
Particularly, he examined the remarks of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy before the House Judiciary Committee when the Attorney General defined the government's position on the matter, stating, "We did not include other establishments
which were constitutionally within the reach of Federal regulation either because they
do not customarily discriminate ... [or] ... removal of discriminatory practices could
3 2
be voluntarily induced."
The bill finally agreed upon, in a secret session of House and Senate leaders (of
which there is no published report), was not adequate in the opinion of several members of Congress. The Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier noted that the "subcommittee bill would have covered virtually all places of public accommodation ... to
the limit of the Federal Government's power to legislate ... and would have avoided
many anomalous situations." 33
The legislator's comments are significant when read in the light of an important
concurring opinion in one of the recent sit-in cases. 3 4 In Lombard v. Louisiana Mr.
Justice Douglas realistically examined the relationship of private enterprise to public
service:
there is hardly any enterprise that does not feel the pinch of some public regulation from price control to health and fire inspection. ... State licensing and
surveillance of a business serving the public also brings its service into the public domain ... [T]he state's interest in and activity with regards to restaurants extends far beyond any mere income producing licensing requirement. There is
no constitutional way ... in which a state can license and supervise a business
81Ibid.
82Hearingson H.R. 7152 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., No.
IV, Pt. 10, at 2655 (1963).
13Supra note 23.
"' Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). See also Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963), Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963), and Cober v.
City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963). All four of these cases involved sit-ins and civil
rights and were decided on May 20, 1963. They involved either municipal ordinances
(Peterson: CODE OF GREENVILLE 1953 as amended 1958, § 31-8; Gober and Shuttlesworth:
GEN. Crry CODE OF BIRMINGHAM of 1944, § 824) or a police directive (Lombard). In each
case the Court found that the state's involvement was of a sufficient degree that the arrests
were deprivations of constitutional guarantees under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
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serving the public and enclothe it with the authority to manage that business
on the basis of apartheid which is foreign to pure constitution.35
Proprietor Sdrales, in this case, had to qualify for a Utah liquor license before the
Seventy Three could do business. Upon qualification Sdrales was subject to periodic
inspections36 and was prohibited from selling liquor to anyone who did not have a
Utah state liquor permit,3 7 or to a member of the prohibited class as defined in the
statutes. 3 8 True, Mr. Sdrales was the owner of the Seventy Three Inn, but "ownership
does not equal domination. The more an owner opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."' 9 Appellee Sdrales, by running a public
establishment, may not refuse to serve a person unless that person was a "prohibited"
individual within the meaning of the UTAH CODE ANN., tit.32, c.7, §§15-17. His "private conduct" would not be regarded as "abridging individual rights" violating "the
equal protection clause" save for the fact that "to some significant extent the state in
any of its manifest actions has been found to become involved in it."40
Fundamentally, the legislators knew in their formulation of the federal statute
that bars and saloons could not be separated from a comprehensive listing of public
accommodations facilities. Realistically, they knew that festering hotbeds of racial
conflict could quickly be brought to the boiling point given the proper amount of
alcohol. Perhaps they deliberately chose not to "list" these facilities, and instead
clothed the possibilities of coverage in broad terms that would serve the dual purpose
of placating the opposition to the bill while providing a structure into which bars
and saloons could later be incorporated in the event of failure of "voluntary compliance" or attacks under the fourteenth amendment.
15Lombard, Supra note 34.
"*4UTAH CODE ANN., tit. 32, ch. I, § 2 (1953).
814 UTAH CODE ANN., tit. 32, ch. 8, § 16 (1953).
184 UTAH CODE ANN., tit. 32, ch. 2, § 7 (1953). No designation of color appears on this
form. Title 76, ch. 34, § 1 prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to Indians, was repealed in 1955.
"9Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
"Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination-Subversive Activities Control Act Registration-Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965).
THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIEs CONTROL Acr OF 19501 CREATED the Subversive Activities

Control Board 2, an administrative body authorized to order any "Communist' Internal Security Act of 1950 (tit. 1, Subversive Activities Control Act), 64 Stat. 987 (1950),
50 U.S.C. §§781-826 (1964).

'Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 997 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §791 (1964).
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action organization ' to register with the Attorney General 4 in a manner and
form he specifies. Should the Communist part of the United States, as a "Communist-action organization", or its officers fail to register with the Attorney General
in compliance with the Board's orders by filing among other information a list
of party members, the act provides that individual party members must then file
a registration statement.5 The party failed to register, and William Albertson and
Roscoe Quincy Proctor, alleged members of the Communist party, also failed to
register.
The act further provides that the Attorney General may petition the Board for
an order requiring individual members to register. 6 Such a petition was filed in
the instant case, evidentiary hearings were held,7 and both Albertson and Proctor were determined to be party members. The Board thereupon ordered each of
them to register, but both refused to comply. Under portions of the act providing
for judicial review of the Board's orders, 8 they filed a petition in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, praying inter alia that the registration requirements of the act be declared violative of their fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and that, as a result, the Board's orders be
declared invalid and set aside. Petitioners claimed that registration required admissions which subjected the registrant to possible prosecution under federal
criminal statutes, as well as other information which could be used for investigative purposes and ultimately lead to criminal prosecution.9 The Court of Appeals,
on the basis of Communist Party v. S.A.C.B.,o affirmed the Board's orders by holding
that the self-incrimination issue was not ripe for adjudication. 1 Albertson and
12
Proctor appealed, and certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.
In an 8-0 opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reversed and held: Petitioners' self-incrimination claims are ripe for adjudication, 1 the registration requirements of the act invade the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the immunity provision of the act is ineffective in supplanting the privilege and the protection that privilege was designed to afford. The opinion did not declare the registration requirement un18 Fed. Reg. 2515 (1953).
'Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §786 (a) (1964).
Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §787 (1964).
6Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §792 (a) (1964).
Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §792 (c) (1964).
8Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §793 (1964).
Albertson v. S.A.C.B., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). The Court pointed out that registration required
an admission of membership which might be used to prosecute the registrant under §4 (a) of
the act, 64 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §783 (a) (1964), or under the membership clause of the
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §2585 (1964). For a discussion of the other federal criminal statutes
which might be applied against Communist party members, see CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF
LIBERTY 126 (1956), and Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HAav. L. REv. 583
(1951).
10Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
" Albertson v. S.A.C.B., 382 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"Albertson v. S.A.C.B., 381 U.S. 910 (1964).
11Petitioners faced the alternative of registration and exposure to prosecution under
federal criminal statutes, cited note 9 supra, or failure to register and severe penalties provided by the act, 64 Stat. 1002, 50 U.S.C. §794 (a) (1964).
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constitutional, since a member of the party could waive the privilege and register.
However, over the course of "protracted litigation"14 since the inception of the
act in 1950, not one member of any "Communist-action organization" has
registered under any conditions, and the apparent effect of the decision will
be to render the registration provision of the act completely unenforceable.' 5
In original form, the constitutional protection that "No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"1 6 was designed
to protect a person from being compelled to give oral testimony against himself
in a criminal proceeding in which he was a defendant. Judicial development
of the privilege, however, has considerably broadened its scope. Although there
was no explicit reference to the privilege as guaranteed by the Constitution, an
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr17 constituted the first
judicial enlargement of the privilege; there the Court extended the privilege to
a witness as well as a defendant. Other early developments of the privilege opened its application to civil cases, again without reference to the Constitution, rather on the basis of established common law.)8
The constitutional guarantee of the privilege as applied to a witness was not
assured until the Supreme Court's decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock.19 There
it was held that a witness before a grand jury could invoke the privilege, and that,
as a constitutional guarantee, the privilege was beyond the limiting power of
the legislature. Citing Counselman, but enlarging the scope of the privilege there
developed, the Supreme Court declared in McCarthy v. Arndstein20 that the privilege was constitutionally guaranteed in civil cases as well as criminal cases. Much
later, the Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege was to enlarge
its protection even further: in Quinn v. United States21 the Court held that the
privilege could be invoked by a witness appearing before a legislative committee.
Thus, the privilege has judicially developed from a rather narrow to a now broadly
available immunity.
Today the privilege may be invoked in any proceeding in which the testimony
is legally required, in which such testimony might be used against a person in
future criminal proceedings, or which might be used to uncover further evidence
against him. 22 It extends to all manners of proceedings, 23 whether adversary or
"Over the last fifteen years the government has failed to successfully apply registration
requirements against the Communist party. However, recently the party was fined $230,000
for failure to register. See Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 1. Cf. Communist Party v.
S.A.C.B., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd, 351 U.S. 115 (1956); Communist Party v.
S.A.C.B., 277 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1959) aff'd, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Communist Party v. United
States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964).
11N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1965, p. 1.
16U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
725 Fed. Cas. 38 (No. 14692e) (C.C. Va. 1807).
s Forbes v. Willard, 54 Barb. 520 (N.Y. 1868).
'o 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

-266 U.S. 34 (1924).
349 U.S. 155 (1955).

Cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 19, at 562, where the privilege is discussed as
having the purpose of safeguarding a person from being compelled to give testimony which
might show that he himself had committed a crime.
2

2

8

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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ex parte, 24 trial or grand jury, 25 in investigations by a legislature or body having
a legislative function, 26 or in administrative investigation. 27 Moreover, it is to
be liberally construed as affording full protection against the harm it was in28
tended to limit or obviate altogether.
As an exclusively personal right, the privilege is generally available when an
individual is reasonably led to believe a disclosure would be incriminatory. 29 Rather than a narrow interpretation, therefore, the privilege as it has been judicially
developed is now broadly available:
A witness in any proceeding whatsoever in which testimony is legally required may refuse to answer any question, his answer to which might be used
against him in a future criminal proceeding, or which might uncover further
evidence against him.8 0
However, the "required records" doctrine has developed as an exception to this
rule. Under the exception, an incriminatory disclosure may be compelled without invading the privilege where either public records or the records of a collective group are required by law. Disclosure may be compelled even if the records
would incriminate personally the agent or officer charged with the record-keep8
ing function. '
A leading decision in the early development of the required records doctrine
is Shapiro v. United States;8 2 there it was held that the privilege is unavailable even
when incriminating records are legally required to be kept by an individual.
There it was obvious that the records of a collective group were not involved, and
it is open to question whether the required records were of a public character. As
in Albertson, the records were required of an individual and were not clearly
cognizable as public records, although the Court in holding the privilege unavailable declared that the records had "public aspects." 83 Shapiro was presented on an
appeal from a conviction for illegal tie-in sales after petitioner had produced required records of sales of fruit and vegetables in compliance with an agency subpoena issued under the Emergency Price Control Act. Petitioner claimed the
act invaded his privilege against self-incrimination inasmuch as compliance
compelled incriminating disclosures which would lead to subsequent prosecution. Because the legally required records had "public aspects", they were not priv2

'Ibid.

1 Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 19.'
The first Supreme Court decisions on the issue were Quinn v. United States, supra note
21, and Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
2
1ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, at 478-80 (1893).
28
WIGMORI, supra note 23.
2 Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 19.
10Pittman, The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509, 593
(1956).
mCf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 561
(1911); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259

(1927).
s335 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 54.

T
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ileged and were competent evidence against him. 4 Distinguishing between
private records which support the privilege, and records having "public aspects"
and hence not privileged, the Court laid down the following principle:
. . . the privilege which exists as to private papers cannot be maintained in
relation to "records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation, and the enforcement of restrictions validly established."35
In Shapiro, therefore, it appears that so long as the records kept by private individuals are required as a reasonably necessary function with a proper governmental purpose, those records are competent evidence against their maker, notwithstanding the possibility of self-incrimination. In Albertson, however, the
Subversive Activities Control Act required Communist party members as individuals to complete and file records detailing information relevant neither to the
party as a collective group nor to records clearly of a public nature. A finding,
then, that a proper governmental purpose necessitated compliance with the act
seemed essential. The government contended in Albertson that although petitioners might challenge particular points within the records they were required
to complete and file, they could not refuse to submit records altogether.8 6 The basis
for this position was the argument that a proper governmental purpose was involved and, as a result, registration records could be required.8 7 Therefore, it appears that consistent with United States v. Sullivan38 petitioners could not be
compelled to complete and file the registration records as long as compliance
would have resulted in the disclosure of incriminating information.
Government counsel, arguing that petitioners were required to comply with
the act by completion and filing the registration forms, claimed that Sullivan
"squarely controlled"39 the issues in the instant case. Defendant in error in that
case refused to file an income tax return as required by the Revenue Act of 1921,
on the grounds that compulsory disclosures of his gains from illicit traffic in liquor
violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court held, in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, that
If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but
could not on that account refuse to make any return at all .... It would be
an extreme if not extravagant application of the fifth amendment to say
that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because
u Id. at 55.
MId. at 33 & n.42.
Brief for Respondent, p. 27.
87Cf. Boyd v. United States, supra note 31; Wilson v. United States, supra note 31; Shapiro
v. United States, 'supra note 32; United States v. Sullivan, supra note 31; WIGMORE, SUpra
note 23.
81Supra note 51.
Brief for Respondent, p. 27.
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it had been made a crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other
point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon. 40
Government counsel had urged in that case that while a particular point might
by tested within the return, petitioners could not refuse to file the prescribed
forms altogether.
In Sullivan, of course, the Court upheld the taxing power of Congress, previously recognized as a proper governmental purpose. Thus, the required records
doctrine, developed as an exception to the traditionally broad scope of the privilege, rests in large part on a policy judgment of what is necessary to reasonably
fulfill a proper governmental purpose. 41 Statutes which require that individuals
maintain records which might prove compulsorily incriminating are to that extent defensible: ". .. the privilege which exists as to private papers cannot be
maintained in relation to records required by law to be kept in order that there
may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects
of governmental regulation ... "42
Russell v. United States,4 3 a recent decision involving a firearms registration
statute requiring disclosures that might result in criminal prosecution, provides
instructive contrast. In that case the government advanced the argument that
Sullivan controlled and, therefore, that incriminating disclosures could be compelled without violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, by virtue of
the particular purpose served by the registration statute. The ninth circuit, sustaining defendant's self-incrimination claim, rejected this argument and distinguished Sullivan by noting that the defendant in the earlier case could submit the required records in full compliance with the law and, exercising the privilege, could decline to disclose incriminating information. 44 On the other hand,
in Russell, the court pointed out, defendant could not register in any manner
without disclosing incriminating information. Thus, in Russell, even minimal
compliance necessarily would have resulted in an incriminatory disclosure. In
both Russell and Albertson, registration required a disclosure possibly constituting admission of an essential element of a crime 45 or an important investigatory lead.
Petitioners' claims are not asserted in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with
criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's questions in context
might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a
crime. 46
It would seem, therefore, that neither the required records doctrine nor public
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-4 (1927).

"Supra note 37.
Shapiro v. United States, supra note 32.
'9306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 409.
,5Cf. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Emspak v. United States, supra note 26;
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
'9
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or governmental interest are sufficient to outweigh the policies behind the privilege when even minimal compliance with the registration statute would require
incriminating disclosures. Of course, it may be argued on the authority of the
"clear and present danger" doctrine of Dennis v. United States47 and scattered
congressional pronouncements 48 that the Communist party, its members, and
their activities should be subject to statutory regulation resting on a proper governmental purpose. Without raising disquieting first amendment questions,
Albertson can be considered both an expansion of the privilege against selfincrimination and a judicial reassessment of legislation based on proper governmental purpose.
10 Albertson v. S.A.C.B., supra note 9.
37 U.S. 494 (1951).
541
"Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. §841 (1964).

Criminal Law-Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual PunishmentDriver v. Hinnant,No. 10, 116,4th Cir., Jan. 22, 1966.
UPON HIS PLEA OF GUILTY entered in the Superior Court of Durham County, North
Carolina, Joe B. Driver was sentenced to two years imprisonment for each of two
offenses of public drunkenness occurring on December 18 and 19, 1963; the
terms were to run concurrently. This was Driver's fifth conviction for public
drunkenness within the span of one year. The statute under which he was convicted, N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-335 (Supp. 1963), provides in pertinent part:

If any person shall be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway,
or at any public place or meeting, in any county ... herein named he shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in this section: ...
12. In Durham [County] .... by a fine, for the first offense, of not more than
fifty dollars ($50.00), or imprisonment for not more than thirty days; for the
second offense within a period of twelve months, by a fine of not more than
one hundred dollars ($100.00) or imprisonment for not more than sixty
days; and for the third offense within any twelve months' period, such offense is declared a misdemeanor, punishable as a misdemeanor within the
discretion of the court.
The judgment of the trial court was appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Appointed counsel urged on appeal that, in view of Driver's chronic alcoholism,' the sentence of imprisonment subjected appellant to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment,2 as applied to the states

1Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
2U.S. CONST.
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under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The judgment was
affirmed, 8 and Driver was imprisoned. His federal habeas corpus petition was
denied.4 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
the judgment of the district court denying the writ was vacated and the case remanded. 5 The issue was framed in the circuit court thus: "...whether a chronic
alcoholic, as appellant Joe B. Driver has been proven and confesses to be, can
constitutionally be criminally convicted and sentenced, as he was, for public
drunkenness." 6 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily upon Robinson v. California,7 a case in which the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion on the analogous issue surrounding narcotics addiction.
The fact of appellant's chronic alcoholism was undisputed. As pointed out by
the circuit court,
Driver was 59 years old. His first conviction for public intoxication occurred
at 24. Since then he has been convicted of this offense more than 200 times.
For nearly two-thirds of his life he has been incarcerated for these infractions
....Our discussion and decision, it must be recalled throughout, presupposes
an indisputable finding that the offender is a "chronic alcoholic." s
Judge Bryan pointed out that chronic alcoholism "is now almost universally
accepted medically as a disease." 9
Cases of this nature present the difficult problem of locating the nexus between
a sickness, or more precisely the public manifestations of symptoms, and the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The relative
dearth of eighth amendment case law is no indication of the quantity of history
underlying the guarantee. It has traditionally been thought that the eighth
amendment proscription first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1688.10
The framers of this historic document were much concerned with the atrocities
committed under the reign of the Stuarts." Similar provisions appeared in many
state constitutions adopted after the Declaration of Independence but before
the formulation of the United States Constitution.1 2 In 1791 the provision was
incorporated into the Constitution as one of the Bill of Rights.
No doubt the framers of the federal constitution had in mind the severe barbarities that had prevailed under English criminal law.' 3 Burnings, brandings,
8State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 1.
'Driver v. Hinnant, No. 10,116, 4th Cir., Jan. 22, 1966.
'Id. at 2.
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
'Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 5, at 4.
Here the court cited 2 CECIL & LOEB, A TExTBooK OF MEDICINE 1625 (10th ed. 1959).
GUTFMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 318-322 (1952), JELLINEK, THE DSEASE
CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 41-44 (1960). See also PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PUB. No. 730, ALcOHOLISM, for several definitions of alcoholism as a disease.
"°Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389 (1910) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
White). See also 3 CATH. U. L. REv. 117 (1953), 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 846 (1961).
U3 CATH. U. L. REv. 117, 118 (1953).
12 VA. CONST. §9, Weems v. United States, supra note 10, at 393 (dissenting opinion).
18Weems v. United States, supra note 10, at 389-90.
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disembowelings, and other familiar forms of torture were to be forbidden. 14 It is
not to be thought, of course, that recognition of this focal concern on the part
of the constitutional draftsmen necessarily precludes an expansion of the amendment's scope or forecloses depth analysis of its underlying spirit. The early opinions, however, admitted little latitude into the provision.
The Supreme Court in Pervear v. Commonwealth'5 stated in dictum that a
fine of fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor for three months for illegal
sale and possession of intoxicating liquor was within constitutional limits. In
Wilkerson v. Utah' 6 a state statute providing that "a person convicted of a capital
offense should suffer death by being shot, hanged or beheaded" was sustained.
In the case of In re Kemmler,17 disposed of on jurisdictional grounds,' 8 the Court
enunciated the established pattern of early thinking, at least with respect to the death
penalty, with the statement:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and something more than the mere extinguishment of life. 19
Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont,2 0 however, indicates that the early,
limited view was not universally accepted at the turn of the century. It was his
thesis that the ban against cruel and unusual punishment was directed not
only against punishments which inflict torture "but against all punishments
which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." He believed that "the whole inhibition is against that which is
excessive in the bail required or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted." 2 '
In Weems v. United States22 the Supreme Court for the first time broadened the
meaning of the clause. In that case Weems was freed on the ground that his sentence was cruelly disproportionate to the offense for which it had been imposed.
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted . . . from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
23
it birth.
Curiously, the leading state case cited by the Court in support of its position was
24
State v. Driver, decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina1
1,op. cit. supra note 10, for a review of the limited legislative history available.

'572 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866).
1099 U.S. 130 (1878).
- 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
Failure to apply the eighth amendment to the states resulted in the lack of a federal
question.
19
In re Kemmler, supra note 17, at 447.
144 U.S. 323 (1892).
Quoted with approval in Weems v. United States, supra note 10, at 371.
22Supra note 10.
3
2 Id. at 373.
- 78 N.C. 423 (1878).
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The subsequent development one might expect from a decision such as Weems
never occurred. The "disproportionate" principle was established, but the comparative approach used in its application by the Court was obliquely repudiated
25
in Badders v. United States.
The next phase in the evolutionary process occurred in Trop v. Dulles.26 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren inferred that mental cruelty as well as
physical torture is forbidden by the Constitution.27 This pronouncement was
followed shortly by the Robinson decision, 28 which held unconstitutional a California statute subjecting the petitioner to criminal confinement for the status
of being a narcotics addict.
The ratio decidendi of Robinson is not at all clear aside from the fact that it
was premised upon the eighth amendment. In his majority opinion, Mr. Justice
Stewart cites Francis v. Resweber 2 0 as supporting the proposition that making a
criminal offense of a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment .... 30 However, as pointed out in a
recent comment 3 ' on the case, the point which Mr. Justice Stewart was making
is not forced upon the reader with unmistakable clarity. He may have been striking at the unconstitutionality of punishing sick people by imprisonment. It
may be said, on the other hand, that he was condemning a sentence cruelly excessive in relation to the crime charged when he made the statement that "even
one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold." 32 Finally, when he said that addiction is "an illness
which may be contracted innocently,"35 Mr. Justice Stewart could have been attacking the constitutional validity of the power of the legislature to define a crime
without including the element of mens rea.3 4
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas provides greater clarity. It
contains unmistakably the resurrection of the "disproportionate" principal
enunciated in Weems, The offense charged, a sickness, is such that any pun240 U.S. 391 (1916). For an interesting discussion of this effective circumscription of
Weems, see Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment; Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. RaV. 996, 1008-09 (1964).
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
7

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958):
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society ....
Use of denationalization as a
punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment. There may be involved no physical
mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society.
2 Supra note 7.
1

329 U.S. 459 (1947).
80Robinson v. California, supra note 7, at 666.
81Campbell, supra note 25, at 1009-10.
8 Robinson v. California, supra note 7, at 667.

0Ibid.
84For a persuasive argument in favor of bestowing constitutional significance to the concept
of mens rea, see Parker, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUPREME COURT REviEw 107.
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ishment would be excessive and thus prohibited by the eighth amendment: "The
addict is a sick person. He may, of course, be confined for treatment or for the
protection of society. Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a crime.. .. "35
Despite the apparent ambivalence in the Robinson majority opinion with
respect to the particular evil being condemned, one point seems clear; the eighth
amendment does apply to the states. The Court did not even pause to consider
7
36
the subject. Rather, it cited Francis v. Resweber as standing for the proposition3
The nexus, then, between an illness and the ban against cruel and unusual
punishment seems to have been supplied by the Robinson holding, read in
the context of the "disproportionate" principle expounded in Weems. The fourth
circuit in Driver v. Hinnant3 8 simply took the next logical step, one foreseen
by Mr. Justice White.39 It applied the ban to criminal convictions for public man40
ifestation of disease symptoms.
Throughout the opinion of Judge Bryan runs one qualification. Only that
compulsive behavior which is symptomatic of the disease is excused from criminality.
With respect to behavior not necessarily characteristic of chronic alcoholism, the
traditional standards of criminality presumably remain unaffected. 4 1

Supra note 7, at 676-78.
Supra note 29.

7 Robinson v. California, supra note 7, at 666. Francis was less than decisive of the issue,
since the Court there specifically assumed, but did not decide, the applicability of the amendment to the states. A long line of cases before Francis had specifically held that the eighth
amendment did not so apply. See Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867);
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Howard v.
Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (the Court here apperaed to consider it an open question);
Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915).
8 Supra note 5.
' Robinson v. California, supra note 7, at 688 (dissenting opinion):
If it is "cruel and unusual punishment" to convict appellant for addiction, it is difficult
to understand why it would be any less offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment to convict him for use on the same evidence of use which proved he was an addict. It is significant that in purporting to reaffirm the power of the States to deal with the narcotics
traffic, the Court does not include among the obvious powers of the State the power to
punish for the use of narcotics. I cannot think that the omission was inadvertent.
4" It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a criminal
offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.
A State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims of
these and other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving
quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459. Driver v.
Hinnant, supra note 5, at 7, quoting Robinson v. California, supra note 7, at 666.
"Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 5, at 7-8. Driver may be significant from another standpoint. It makes much of the non-volitional aspect of appellant's conduct. When read in conjunction with Mr. Justice Stewart's observations in Robinson, the opinion seemingly betrays
a trend toward recognition of constitutional significance in the concept of mens rea, in contrast to the principles expounded in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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Federal Procedure-Diversity Jurisdiction and Venue in Stockholder Actions
-Federal Injunction on State Judgment-Dowd v. Front Range Mines, Inc.,
242 F. Supp. 519 (D.Col. 1965).
IN

JANUARY,

1961,

DOROTHY

D.

BROWN HELD

in default various notes of Front Range

Mines, Inc. Robert Mitchell, attorney for Front Range and a former director, agreed
to represent Brown in collection. An extension agreement was reached between
Brown and Front Range whereby the directors would allow no encumbrance against
the corporation's assets until the Brown notes were paid. The extended notes were
defaulted in November, 1961. Front Range, through the efforts of Mitchell and a
director named Snodgrass, co-operated with Brown by entering a confession of indebtedness in a Colorado state court. Brown, Snodgrass, and Mitchell purchased at
the ensuing sheriff's sale the assets of Front Range for a fraction of their market value.
Certain stockholders at Front Range, taking exception to these manipulations,
brought a derivative action against Mitchell and two of the corporation's directors
(residents of Colorado) and Snodgrass and Brown (residents of Louisiana). Suit
was filed in the U. S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Stockholder plaintiffs were citizens of Michigan and New York. Front Range Mines was incorporated
in Colorado. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the state confession judgment and to set aside the sheriff's deeds under which defendants claimed
the Front Range assets sold to satisfy Brown's judgment.
In answer defendants moved that the Colorado District Court was without diversity jurisdiction, that even with jurisdiction the court could not lay proper venue,
and finally that the federal court was without power to grant the relief requested by
the plaintiffs. In an opinion written by Judge Doyle, the court held: that Front Range
could be aligned as a defendant creating diversity jurisdiction, that §1401 of the Judicial Code does not impose a "double diversity" requirement, and that a federal
court can exercise its equity jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a fraudulently
obtained state confession judgment.1
The district court took jurisdiction of the controversy on the basis of 28 U.S.C.
§1332 (a) (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil suits where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between: (1) citizens of different states.
The amount in controversy was not in dispute. The presence of diversity of citizenship was found when the court aligned Front Range as a defendant. Since this left
no Colorado plaintiffs, complete diversity existed. Normally, because the derivative
action is brought for and on behalf of the corporation, the corporation is a nominal
party aligned as a plaintiff. Doctor v. Harrington2 had made it clear, however, that a
corporation may be aligned as a defendant for diversity purposes. This position was
1

Dowd v. Front Range Mines, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 591 (D. Col. 1965).
196 U.S. 579 (1905).
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265

reaffirmed in 1908 in Venner v. Great Northern R.R.3 The special dispensation allowing a party whose real interest was that of a plaintiff to be aligned with the defendant
for diversity purposes was again affirmed in 1947. 4 That a corporation may in appropriate circumstances be made a defendant in derivative actions may, therefore,
be conceded. 5
When realignment is permissible is a more difficult question. Koster v. (American)
Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co,6 explains that in a derivative action the parties
are not realigned for diversity purposes according to their real interest if the corporation is in "antagonistic hands." Smith v. Sperling and its companion case, Swanson v. Traer,7 express current thinking on what constitutes "antagonism." Two principles emerge. First, "antagonism" exists when the corporate directors refuse to take
action or undo a business transaction, or when a shareholder's request for such action would be futile. Second, "antagonism" is determined not by trying the case on
its merits but by looking only to the pleadings. Yet, Smith admits that the necessary
antagonism is not that between the stockholders and directors, but that between the
directors and the best financial interests of the corporation.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Smith that the special
exception for corporate realignment seems to have its origin in that very case. The
case appears to hold that the corporation will be realigned as a defendant if the stockholder pleads that the directors refused a request to take action. Justice Frankfurter
would have preferred the test used by the lower courts in the adjudication of Smith.8
While it seems probable that there will be some withdrawal from the present definition of "antagonistic control", 9 the facts of the instant case are within even the
more conservative suggestion of Justice Frankfurter. Here, according to the pleaded
facts, all members of the board of directors were collaborating to divest Front Range
of its assets.
The Colorado District Court found antagonistic control and aligned Front Range
as a defendant. This avoided the problem of having Colorado directors and a
Colorado corporation on opposite sides of the suit. Complete diversity was then
S209 U.S. 24 (1907).
'Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut, Casualty Co., 333 U.S. 518 (1947).

'See also Sharp v. Bonham, 224 U.S. 241 (1912); City of Indianapolis v. Chase National
Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
6333 U.S. 518 (1947).
1354 U.S. 91 (1956).
8117 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd 237 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1956). These lower courts
held that antagonism existed, "if the corporation has suffered an actionable wrong and is
in 'antagonistic hands'-i.e. so dominated that it can not act in keeping with its own
financial interest." This definition of antagonistic control makes it clear that the antagonism
must exist between the directors and the best financial interest of the company. While the
Supreme Court in the Smith case admitted that the antagonism spoken of is between the
directors and the corporation's financial interest, its test seems to measure antagonism between the directors and a group of stockholders. It would seem that a difference of business
opinion between the directors and a stockholder would be sufficient to constitute antagonistic control.
0Kartub v. Optical Fashions, 158 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In this case the court
found no antagonism. The corporation had three directors two of whom had resigned and
the third had died. The court found that where there were no directors there could be no
antagonistic control. Perhaps a total lack of directors is the only situation which will fail
to produce antagonism under the Smith decision.
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present. When the court had found jurisdiction, however, it was then faced with a
most perplexing problem of federal venue. The normal venue requirement in a diversity action is defined in §1391 (a) of the Judicial Code:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.' 0
Clearly §1391 is of little use in this suit. There is no possible forum which would be
the judicial district "where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." Only the exception
"as otherwise provided by law" could provide a forum for Dowd. Plaintiffs found
such an exception in §1401 of the Judicial Code:
Any civil action by a stockholder on behalf of his corporation may be prosecuted
in any judicial district where the corporation might have sued the same defendants."
Section 1401 normally solves venue problems in a stockholder's action, but Dowd
presents the situation in which the statute has caused considerable confusion. Front
Range and the director-defendants were located in Colorado for venue purposes.
Section 1401 provides that venue may be laid "where the corporation might have sued
the same defendants." On purely venue grounds there is no objection to Front Range
suing in Colorado, its state of incorporation. If, on the other hand, §1401 contemplates not only venue but also jurisdictional considerations, Front Range could not
2
sue in the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado.1
Clay v. Thomas'3 speaks of a jurisdictional requirement in §1401 as imposing a
standard of "double diversity, i.e., diversity between the plaintiffs and all the defendants, including the corporation, and, in addition, diversity between the corporation
and the other defendants."'14 The argument for "double diversity" in §1401 relies primarily on Schoen v. Mountain Producers.'5 Schoen held that where a corporation
might have brought a suit depends on which district could satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement as well as which district was proper from the venue standpoint. The case
traced the legislative history and found that §1401 was originally written to correct a
particular defect in the federal venue statute. 16 This defect occurred when the injured corporation and the wrongdoer were residents of separate states. Venue could
not be laid in a federal court and service on the out of state resident was impossible
in the state court. The court in Schoen held that where the injured corporation and
1028 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (1964).
"28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
'2 The reason Front Range did not sue was lack of diversity as required under § 1332.
'8 185 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
'Id. at 811, n.4.
170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948). Actually Schoen was decided on the basis of old § 51 of
the Judicial Code, 49 Stat. 1213 (1936). The change to § 1401 was slight and the case is
still authority if it was correctly decided. Section 51 spoke of the place where the suit "might
have been brought" by such corporation. Section 1401 reads: "where the corporation might
have sued the same defendants."
11Id. at 711.
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the defendants resided in the same state, as in the instant case, a corporate exception
for federal venue was unnecessary since a remedy was available in the state court. If
Schoen is controlling, clearly Dowd was incorrectly decided. Schoen, however, fails
to explain why a venue statute should be read with jurisdictional content.
Schoen is now a minority view; most of the cases concur with Wright's analysis of
§1401.17 Speaking of "double diversity" he states:
This reasoning, as the leading case supporting it recognizes, introduces a jurisdictional element into a venue statute. Such a construction seems unnecessary,
by denying venue in the most convenient district it leads to undesirable results,
and it is hardly required by-indeed seems contrary to-the language of the statute.I 8
Industrial Wax v. InternationalRailroads of Central America19 accords with the
Dowd decision. That case held that §1401 permits a stockholder's action to be brought
in the district where the corporation might have sued the same defendants, is concerned only with venue, and does not include any jurisdictional requirement. Salzman v. Birrell 2o pointed out that "the language [in the statute] is manifestly concerned with choice of district, a problem which does not even arise until a jurisdictional basis already exists." Double diversity, the court pointed out, "would not execute the policy of the statute which is designed to facilitate the bringing of stockholder suits."2 1 Glicker v. Bradford,2 2 another case from the Southern District of New
York, called §1401 "simply a venue statute." 23 The weight of authority, then, favors
the Dowd position, that §1401 relates only to venue and contains no jurisdictional
implications.
Dowd was properly before the court, but the difficult question of the district court's
ability to grant the requested relief remained. Although a district court has always
been able to enjoin proceedings in a state court, this can be done only within the restricted boundaries set by Congress in §2283 of the Judicial Code:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a state court except as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress, or when
24
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
In the instant case plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the execution of a state court
judgment. Defendants contended that the authority of Toucey v. New York Life In" King v. Wall and Beaver, 91 App. D.C. 327, 145 F.2d 377 (1944).
"WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 73, at 277 (1963).
"193 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"078 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
21Id. at 784.
2204 F. Svpp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
12Id. at 306. For background discussion of the diversity and venue problems in stockholder actions and proposed solutions see Keeffe, Service of Process in Suit Against Directors, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 279 (1942); Keeffe, Twenty-nine Distinct Damnations, 7 VAND.
L. REV. 636 (1954); Keeffe, Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code,
38 VA. L. REv. 569 (1952).
- 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
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surance Co.25 prevented this injunction. Toucey was decided under §265 of the Judicial Code, 26 the predecessor of §2283. The section at the time of Toucey read:
The writ of injunction shall not be granted to stay proceedings in any court
of a state, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to a proceeding in bankruptcy.
Both §2283 and §265 have as a common ancestor §5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793.27
Toucey discussed at length the history of a federal court's inability to enjoin a state
court proceeding. The court there concluded that considerations of federalism and
the necessity of harmony between state and federal courts required the inability of
28
one to enjoin the other.
There is no point in quarreling with the Toucey decision or the history it recites.
The relevant question is, what does §2283 do to Toucey? There are two Supreme
Court cases directly construing §2283, Amalgamated Clothing v. Richman29 and
Leiter Minerals v. United States.30
Amalgamated involved a labor dispute. The injunction was on the plaintiff's claim
that the labor dispute was a federal question under Taft/ Hartley. The court held that
it was not clearly a federal question, therefore refused the injunction, and pointed
out that the union could bring the question before the NLRB. Until the NLRB had
decided that the situation was covered by the Taft/Hartley Act, the Supreme Court
refused to find federal question jurisdiction. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Douglas dissented in Amalgamated. They thought the factual situation of the
case was covered by the Taft/Hartley Act, found federal question jurisdiction, and
would have granted the injunction against proceedings on the state judgment. The
dissenters pointed out that the reviser's notes to §2283 stated that "the revised section
restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey
decision." 8 ' The only conclusion to be reached from a careful analysis of Amalgamated is that it does not settle the question of a federal court's ability to enjoin a state
court. Rather, it was decided on the narrower ground of the Taft/Hartley Act. In
addition, the three justices who found that Taft/Hartley did provide federal question jurisdiction would have granted the injunction.
Leiter involved a federal injunction against a state court. Yet all it really teaches
is that such an injunction may be granted when the plaintiff is the United States.
While Leiter does not deny the possibility of the injunction to a private party, it
carefully indicates that the beneficiary of the injunction in that case was the United
States, a claimant to the mineral rights in the controversy.
Professor Moore maintains: 2
-314 U.S. 118 (1941).
1judiciary Act of 1911 § 265, 35 Stat. 1162.
"'Judicial Code of 1793 § 5, 1 Stat. 335. "... nor shall a writ of injunction be granted [by
any court of the United States] to stay proceedings in any court of a state...".
2 Toucey decided that a federal court could not enjoin a suit in a state court even though
the same suit had already been litigated in the federal court.
348 U.S. 511 (1955).
-o352 U.S. 220 (1957).
81H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1948).
1 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE § 0.202, at 2625 (2d ed. 1953).
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harmonious federal-state relationships are not impaired if it is generally
held that a state court may enjoin the enforcement of a fraudulently obtained
federal judgment; and, conversely, that, while a federal court will not permit
relitigations of issues before it for the purpose of reviewing or correcting state
judgments, it may, when established chancery principles warrant, enjoin the
enforcement of a fraudulently obtained state judgment.
...that

There is little doubt that in the pre-Toucey era a federal court could set aside
a fraudulently obtained state judgment. 38 The question therefore reduces to one of
the accuracy of Moore's assumption that §2283 is a return to pre-Toucey law.
Dowd would uphold Moore's assumption and view §2283 as a clear return to the
pre-Toucey rule of federal injunction against a fraudulently obtained state court
34
decision.
The instant case significantly increases a stockholder's chances of successful litigation in a derivative suit. Realignment for diversity jurisdiction is a well established
practice; Dowd simply follows the modern trend. There the Colorado District Court
added its authority to the growing list of cases opposing the Schoen view of §1401 of
the Judicial Code. In the near future contentions for "double diversity" should become seldom heard and rarely successful.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Dowd is its recognition of the ability of the
district court to enjoin execution on fraudulently obtained state judgments. This extension of federal equity power will be a significant development in stockholder suits,
if the Dowd analysis stands the test of time.
I Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U.S. 86 (1889); Robb v. Vos, 155 U.S. 13 (1894); Howard v.
De Cordova, 177 U.S. 609 (1900).
"'Supra note 31.

Sales-Unconscionable Contracts-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.Cir. 1965).
ORA LEE WILLIAMS, A WELFARE RECIPIENT in the District of Columbia, was sole
provider for her nine children. Between 1957 and 1962 she purchased on time
various household items from the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, culminating in an April, 1962, purchase of a $515 stereo set. Shortly thereafter she defaulted
and the company sought to replevy all items purchased on time since 1957, including the stereo.
The company based its claim on the clause in each sale contract providing
that title would remain in the company until each purchase price was paid in
full, "[but] all payments now and hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be credited
pro-rata on all outstanding ...accounts due the company by [purchaser] at the
time each payment is made."' This clause would retain the company's security

I Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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interest in all items ever purchased there by Mrs. Williams so long as she maintained any balance with the company. While the total amount of her time purchases over the years in question came to $1800 and her total payments to $1400,
an unredeemed security interest remained in every item purchased.
Williams' principal contention in opposing replevin was that the underlying contracts were unconscionable and hence unenforceable. The trial court
ruled that the common law did not recognize unconscionability as a defense
to an action on a contract and found for the company; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that "where the element of unconscionability is present at the
time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced." 3 The court,
through Judge Wright, stated that at "common law ... unconscionable contracts
are not enforceable," 4 recognized the issue as "one of first impression" for the
District of Columbia, and reasoned that judicial power "to protect the public from
... [unconscionable] contracts is evidenced by Congress's adoption of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.

5

The common law gave some recognition to the concepts of mistake, fraud, and
oppression as contract defenses. 6 One form of example is to be found in the
inadequacy of consideration cases. Thus, a promise to pay $600 in consideration of one cent, 7 and a promise to pay a $1400 debt of another for the consideration of $2008 were both held unenforceable, both courts labeling the contracts unreasonable but using the traditional rationale of insufficiency of consideration. In a more recent case, an Oregon court found contract terms between three partners overwhelmingly favorable to two partners at the expense
of the third; the improvident contract was avoided. That court stated that the inference of fraud and undue influence was not sufficiently overcome. 9 Important application of these concepts has been made in the form-contract cases. In
Indianapolis v. Sparks,l0 a money-lender's form contract was held to have contemplated the oppression of the borrower. The Indiana court voided the oppressive clauses as violative of public policy. These authorities, in avoiding an unconscionable result, have articulated their results in terms of substantive contract rules, dehors the fact of unconscionability itself. Williams, on the other
hand, found unconscionability in and of itself a violation of contract rules,
thereby eliminating the need for dual findings. 1
2 198

A.2d 914 (D.C.Ct. App. 1964).
8 Williams, supra note 1, at 449.
"Williams, supra note 1, at 448.
' The District of Columbia adopted the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE on Jan. 1, 1964, before
the Williams decision but after the execution of the contracts in question; thus, the matter
is governed by pre-CoDE law. 77 Stat. 630 (1963). See particularly UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§2-302.
aCoRBIN, CoNmAcrs §128 (1963).
Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861).
Luing v. Peterson, 143 Minn. 6, 172 N.W. 692 (1919).
'Sizemore v. Miller, 196 Ore. 89, 247 P.2d 224 (1952).
'0 Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 172 N.E. 2d 988 (Ind. 1961).
The cases making dual findings appear as authorities cited in the majority opinion of the
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Relief from oppressive or unreasonable engagements has really been a development of traditional equity jurisprudence. In the lead case of Campbell Soup Co.
v. Wentz,12 discussed below, the court refused to grant specific performance to a
contract found to be unconscionable. The greater flexibility of equitable principles enabled courts effectively to rewrite contracts, altering the grossly improvident provisions and, in appropriate cases, award damages accordingly.' 3 Should
the clause in question not admit of effective reformation, as was the case in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,14 involving a complete waiver of implied
warranties, equity will invalidate the intolerable clause, yet sustain the underlying agreement as a basis for awarding damages. However, courts have arrived at
these results without purporting to create a clear rule against unconscionability
15
as such.
The defense of unconscionability is considered a question of first impression
by the Williams court. In the past the Supreme Court has recognized the necessity
of protecting parties from extortionate and unreasonable contract terms and
has suggested that a presumption of fraud be raised; 16 Williams makes further rationalization unnecessary. The Supreme Court has previously limited the party
suing for the breach of an unconscionable contract clause to damages consistent
with the contract as rewritten by the court; 17 Williams sanctions complete refusal
to enforce, where appropriate. In the past the Supreme Court, however, has stopped
short of holding that an unconscionable clause could render the contract wholly
unenforceable; 18 Williams, on the other hand, recognizes the question of relief
as undecided in the District of Columbia, citing Harlan v. Hollingsworth Co.,19
a case holding the rewriting of improvident contracts beyond the province of a
court when the agreement is free of fraud and indicative of independent choice.
Nonetheless, relief has been denied in the District of Columbia to one claiming
under a contract containing unconscionable terms allowing a double recovery.20
While recognizing that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE does not govern the
controversy, the court in the instant case reached the result suggested by the CODE.
Judge Wright stated that "in view of the absence of prior authority on the point,
we consider the congressional adoption of §2-302 persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which the section is explicitly derived." 2 ' The
principal case and particularly Schnell, supra note 7 (failure of consideration and unconscionability), Luing, supra note 8 (fraud and unconscionability), and Sizemore, supra note 9
(public policy violations and unconscionability).
172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870). See generally, DEFUNTAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY §95 (2d ed. 1956).
1 32 N.J. 358, 381, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
15 CORBIN,

supra note 6.

1 Hume v. United States, 82 U.S. 406, 414 (1889).
"Scott v. United States, supra note 13.
Ibid.
50 App. D.C. 270, 279 (1908).
20Jaeger v. O'Donaghue, 57 App. D.C. 191, 18 F.2d 1013 (1927).
21
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., supra note 1, at 449.
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court's reasoning is convincing if §2-302 is a codification of a District of Columbia common law remedy for unconscionability. The official comment states:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
against the contract or clauses which they find unconscionable.... This section is intended to allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionability
of the contract .... 22
The comment lists cases to be regarded as common law forerunners of the section;
Austin Co. v. Tillman2 3 and Greer v. Acros, Ltd.24 may be considered typical. Greer
restricted a blanket clause prohibiting rejection of shipments to instances in
which the claimed discrepancies represented merely mercantile variations. Similarly Austin held a clause limiting the buyer's right to return goods effective only
to the extent the goods delivered reasonably met the contract description. The
impression given by the CODE comments and cases therein cited is not that a
defense of unconscionability existed before the CODE, but that the harshness of
terms which the CODE would label unconscionable was avoided by various indirect
devices at common law. -The comment seems to indicate a view on the part of
the draftsmen that prior to the CODE courts could police against unconscionability only obliquely. A defense of unconscionability may have existed at common
law, but the CODE does not purport to derive from such a remedy. Rather the comments specifically acknowledge the lack of a direct means of rendering contracts
unenforceable merely because they were unconscionable. Because the CODE does
not purport to be a mere codification of a pre-existing contract defense, the court's
reliance upon congressional adoption of the CODE's treatment of unconscionability is open to serious question.
Having determined that the defense was available in the District of Columbia,
the court was faced with the difficult task of formulating a judicial standard easily
adaptable for lower court use. Judge Wright concluded that:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
25
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
The definition imports two key elements. The first element is the absence of a
meaningful choice. Two pre-CODE cases indicate the meaning attached to the
phrase "absence of meaningful choice." In Henningsen26 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the purchaser of an automobile had no meaningful choice
when he signed a contract containing a disclaimer of implied warranties. Such
was the case because the disclaimer in question was contained in all retail automobile sales contracts at the demand of every major manufacturer. Because the
clause was beyond the bargaining power of the consumer, he was held not bound
§2-302, official comment No. 1.
Co. v. Tillman, 104 Ore. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922).
Green v. Acros, Ltd., [1931] 47 T.L.R. 336 (C.A.).
2Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., supra note 1, at 449.
1 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 14.
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

2Austin
24
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by it. In Campbell Soup 27 the third circuit found that a tomato farmer had no
meaningful choice when he contracted to sell his entire crop to the Campbell
Soup Company. Nevertheless, the decision in the last analysis rests on lack of
mutuality of obligation. Finally, the court cited law review material 28 for the proposition that absence of meaningful choice is an element of unconscionability.
The cited material is primarily limited to a discussion of unconscionability with
respect to fine-print contracts and the corresponding obligation of the offeror
to inform the offeree of the contract terms. Meaningful choice, however, in the
sense the court used the term refers not merely to lack of knowledge, but to lack
of knowledge coupled with lack of bargaining position.
The second essential element in a finding of unconscionability is contract
terms unreasonably favorable to one party. Such terms are to be considered "in
the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case." 29 Corbin relates this test to the prevailing "mores and
business practices of the time and place," 8 0 a test designed to necessarily accommodate itself to changing market-place values. To the Williams court an unconscionable contract is one entered into with one party in an inferior bargaining position having a lack of sufficient appreciation of the contract terms, while
the other party demands and receives contract terms which in view of the commercial setting no honest man would demand and no reasonable man would
give.
Williams enunciates the view, then, that unconscionability is a contract defense that obtained in the District of Columbia before the enactment of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE. While relief was granted from unconscionable

con-

tracts, it seems, as a general statement, more probable that such relief was framed
in the language of traditional contract rules than on the grounds that they were
unconscionable. Arguably, reference to congressional enactment of the CODE
in such a case has the effect of sanctioning application of the statute before its
effective date when the statutory rule can reasonably be garnered from asserted
common law and equity principles. The court's definition of unconscionability so closely approximates §2-302 that the definition will serve as a test for cases
litigated under the CODE.3

1

Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, supra note 12.
63 HARV. L. REv. 494 (1950).
SWilliams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., supra note 1, at 450.
80
CORuN, supra note 6.
"It is interesting to note that while Williams was not decided under the CODE, the case is
contained in the U.C.C. REPoRTER to illustrate the thrust of §2-302.

